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Abstract. The author made a research over the past six years, and gathered data regarding 
confrontation as truth-seeking method in the criminal procedure. He analysed the Hungarian 
legal rules of confrontation in historical and recent time and claimed that the concept and the 
types (classification) of confrontation was clear. As an evidentiary procedure, it can be well 
demarcated and distinguished from other applicable means of seeking the truth in CPA and 
beyond it in the area of criminal-tactics. Thus, from interrogation, identification parade, 
attempt to prove, crime scene interrogation, search/body search, parallel hearing of experts, 
polygraph and cross-examination. Above all you can read a few amendment proposals of the 
statutory regulation of confrontation. 
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1. The concept of confrontation 
 
It has become clear from my research with a historical perspective that it was 
not confrontation but rather torture that was used as a regulated method of 
seeking the truth in the ancient times or at the beginning of the feudal Middle 
Ages. Torture began to get ‘loosened’ in the late Middle Ages, in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, when the institution of confrontation came into existence. Torture was 
officially abolished in the 19th century after a temporary duality i.e. coexistence 
and was replaced solely by confrontation sometimes together with an oath on 
the basis of an accusatorial attitude. 
 Confrontation–with a stress on the trial stage–had a detailed legal regulation 
as early as the first part of the 20th century in some codes of criminal procedure 
including the Hungarian one. However, these rules still lack the definition of 
confrontation leaving this task to scholarly jurists. Thus, the notional definition 
and the description of the essential features of confrontation are indispensable.  
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 Before providing the definition, it should be noted that my legal historical 
research has made it clear that in the beginning, in the 17th and 18th centuries 
and even in the 19th century confrontation was also called ‘counter-front-state-
ment’, ‘face to face testifying’, and counter positioning. This latter one indicates 
that the persons confronted stood facing each other. The collation of testimonies 
was sometimes performed–virtually–by reading, which means statements were 
not actually said to somebody’s face. 
 The modern theoretical grounding and the practice based on it is different. 
Special literature seems to be of a unified standpoint claiming that “the essence 
of confrontation is a special, ‘combined’ interrogation, an independent investi-
gatory (procedural) act in the framework of which more than one person is 
interrogated concurrently in order to resolve any marked contradictions 
between testimonies made earlier by the interrogatees.”1  
 The definition I also agree with needs to be made more precise by stating 
that the term ‘more than one person’ can only mean definitely two persons, not 
more and not less. If there were only one person, it would fall into the category 
of general interrogation and there could obviously be no confrontation; if there 
were more than two, the psychological and criminal-tactical reason for its 
existence would be called into question. 
 
 
2. The statutory regulation of confrontation 
 
Pursuant to the effective though fairly brief Section 124 of Act XIX of 1998 
(CPA): 
 
“(1) If the testimonies made by the suspects and the witnesses or the suspect 
and the witness contradict, such contradiction may be clarified by confron-
  
 1 Tremmel, F.–Fenyvesi, Cs.–Herke, Cs.: Kriminalisztika Tankönyv és Atlasz [Text-
book and Atlas on Criminalistics]. Budapest–Pécs, 2005. 385. 
 A similar definition can be found in the German literature. “Confrontation, which 
serves the purpose of eliminating contradictions, is the simultaneous interrogation of the 
persons who have already been interrogated and whose statements markedly differ from 
each other.” Ackermann, R.–Clages, H.–Roll, H.: Handbuch der Kriminalistik. Stuttgart–
München–Hannover–Berlin–Weimar–Dresden, 1997.  
 According to the French special dictionary of criminal law, confrontation is “the 
counter-posing of witnesses, a witness and the victim, or a witness and the suspect. Thus 
their allegations may be checked, collated and measured in the presence of each other.” 
Dictionaire de droit criminel. Paris, 1992.  
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tation if necessary. The persons confronted shall make their testimonies in 
words to each other; they may put questions to each other. 
 (2) The confrontation of the witness and the suspect shall be omitted if 
it is necessitated by the protection of the witness or the suspect. 
 (3) A person not having attained the age of fourteen may be confronted 
provided it arouses no fear in the minor.” 
 
 The statutory regulation may be analysed by the help of the main questions 
(guidelines) of criminalistics. These are: What? Where? When? How? Who? 
With Whom? Why? 
 What is confrontation? It has already been dealt with in the part giving the 
definition of this concept, here it is only added that it is a method of seeking 
the truth expressly not specified or defined by law. It is referred to as an 
‘evidentiary procedure’ in CPA, which can be challenged from a terminological 
point of view, since evidencing is the alpha and omega of the whole criminal 
procedure, there is hardly such a thing as a procedure within a procedure, it is 
extremely misplaced, it bears unnecessary duplication.  
 It is, however, praiseworthy that now it is unfolded from the gown of 
interrogation (of 1973) and now it is given a separate section emphasizing its 
special nature and existence on its own. 
 Where can it be applied? This question should be rephrased as, Which 
authority shall apply it under which section of CPA? 
 Possible stages and actors are: investigatory-police (other investigatory 
organs such as customs investigators are not described here), interim-prosecu-
tion, and trial-judiciary. 
 The issue may be examined from several aspects. On the one hand: 
 a) What was the intention of the law-maker? 
 b) What is the opinion of law enforcement and administration? 
 c) What is the real situation? 
 d) What is the author’s position in this respect? 
 
 Ad a) The legislator would have liked to shift the emphasis to the trial-
judiciary stage in the framework of the reform of criminal procedure initiated 
in the early 1990s. It was indicated by the fact that according to the legislator, 
the main aim of the investigation was to inform the prosecutor and the 
principles characterising the whole procedure could get unfolded in full in the 
trial stage in an independent and impartial court. Consequently, confrontation 
as the application of a truth seeking method was considered appropriate rather 
in the trial-judicial stage partly returning to the model of the CPA of 1896. 
This may be the reason for the polished amendments of the wording of the act 
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such as the inclusion of the word ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ in the scope of 
application and the protection of witnesses/suspects and children, which may 
be implemented more easily before the courts than before the investigatory 
authorities. 
 Ad b) The opinion of law enforcement and administration, judges, pro-
secutors, (defending) counsels and police persons (and suspects) is well 
reflected in the finding of my empirical study:  
 On the average, half of law enforcers and administrators are satisfied with 
the current legal regulation of confrontation with prosecutors standing out of 
this circle. Four fifths of them regard it appropriate as opposed to the suspects, 
of whom only one fifth approve it. The rate of satisfaction is similar in the case 
of the investigatory implementation (48%), while the method of implementing 
it in the trial-judicial stage is ranked at a higher quality level (67%). In accordance 
with it, only one third of the informants would place confrontation in the 
investigatory stage, however, the size of the group preferring the trial stage and 
the size of the group preferring both stages are approximately the same. 
 In other words, no marked dominance has been established by law enforce-
ment and administration concerning the question “where shall we apply confron-
tation?”  
 Ad c) In reality–as supported by the part of the empirical research processing 
files and by the author’s own practice–confrontations on the merit are carried 
out mainly in the investigatory stage, they are performed in the trial-judicial 
stage in a far smaller number and these tend to be formal and unsuccessful due 
to the lack of tension described in the theoretical grounding. 
 Ad d) Fully agreeing with the theoretical shift of emphsis and the increase 
in the importance of the trial-judicial stage related to the reform of CPA, I 
suggest that confrontation–considering mainly its psychological and criminal-
tactical aspects–cannot be preferred and actually applied in the trial-judicial 
stage but rather in the investigatory-fact-finding stage. My argumentation is 
supported not only by the indicators of practical efficiency–which are better in 
the investigatory stage–but also the psychological factors which may bring about 
the situation of distress on the side of the person making untrue statements. These 
psychological factors can hardly be created in huge, impersonal courtrooms 
where the trial with adverserial features is often held in front of the members 
of the press and the general public. There are a lot of things missing such as the 
intimacy of nearby bodies, the effect of surprise as everybody may be familiar 
with the documents of investigation and the former records of trials, the dawn-
raid effect, the harshness of the initial experience and I could keep enumerating. 
All these negatives make the trial application of confrontation unreasonable and 
ungrounded; consequently, I prefer its investigatory implementation. 
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 The issue of the interim procedure may arise where the prosecutor with the 
results of investigation might perform confrontation. In theory. But in theory 
only, because on the one hand investigation has been completed by then and 
the same concerns may arise as in the case of timeliness in the trial stage, in 
other words participants may have become familiar with everything at the 
accomplishement of the investigation. In theory there is the possibility of a 
successful confrontation conducted by the prosecutor in the interim procedure 
where suddenly a new source of evidence for example a new–truthful–witness 
(the victim or the suspect making changes) appears and it has the power of 
surprise in the course of confrontation. This is highly unlikely in reality and so 
is the possibility of a prosecutor noticing the omission of confrontation during 
investigation and then performing it himself. Although nothing excludes its 
performance, empirical data show that members of the prosecuting authority 
rather send the documents back to the investigating authority to perform the 
act(s) of confrontation.  
 Preparing the trial is also part of the interim stage but performing a confron-
tation in that stage is theoretically excluded since proving on the merits or an 
evidentiary procedure cannot be implemented there, it can only be implemented 
in the trial stage. 
 A further argument for performing confrontation in the course of investi-
gation is that interrogation and confrontation have their own methods and 
descriptions which are taught at a professional level in substantial depth and 
number of hours only at the Police College in Hungary. Thus officials at the 
investigating authority may be assumed to have the greatest knowledge and 
competence in this respect.  
 
When and why is confrontation to be applied? 
 
The question does not refer to the issue of the relevant sections of CPA, now 
it should be rephrased as follows: in what cases and/or why must/may confron-
tation be applied? 
 The answer may come partly from procedure law and partly from crimi-
nalistics (more precisely from criminal-tactics). This study covers only the 
legal aspects; its criminal-tactics deserves a separate study.  
 It is clear from the wording of the act that if there is a ‘contradiction’ between 
testimonies, it “may be clarified if necessary.” As lawyers say, each word is an 
‘action-handhold’. Each word has its own importance and each can be examined.2 
  
 2 Mihály Tóth did so in two of his studies on the regulation laid down in the former 
Act on Criminal Procedure, Act I. of 1973, the wording of which differs from the now 
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First, the contradiction has to be interpreted as the following question 
immediately arises: Does the legislator’s intention concern all conflicts and 
contradictions? 
 I do not think this to be the case either in respect of the legislator’s intention 
or the conduct to follow. It would be more appropriate–in accordance with the 
opinions of authors dealing with this issue–to insert an adjective into the legal 
provision, namely the need for confrontation may arise in the case of an 
‘essential’ contradiction. Seeming and trifling contradictions concerning details 
and minutiae are not worth ‘shooting our bolt’ at. I use this phrase deliberately 
as one of the factors in the background of unsuccessful confrontations is the 
huge amount of unnecessary, schematic, apathetic and characterless confronta-
tions lacking atmosphere and concerning insignificant matters which may be 
regarded as a set of ‘forced confrontations’. Concealed behind it–as the findings 
of empirical studies show–is the fear of the police for the prosecution regarding 
the omission of this procedural act as a reason for supplementary investigation 
(‘throwing it back), on the basis of the prosecutors’ requirements. This fear can 
only be eased by the high-level and professionally well established joint (police-
prosecution) interpretation and application of the regulation pertaining to confron-
tation, and on the basis of the mutual responsibility of the two authorities.  
 Mihály Tóth has already specified the most frequent theoretical and practical 
cases of contradictions which I can neither add to nor delete from as there is no 
such need. In his opinion the most frequent contradictions are as follows: 
 „a) The contradiction is only a seeming one as the the persons interrogated 
have stated the same but expressed themselves in a different way. 
 b) The contradiction is a seeming one because the differing statements do 
not concern the same fact. 
 c) The contradiction concerns the same fact but it is not significant from the 
point of view of the instant case. 
 d) The elimination of an essential contradiction concerning the same fact is not 
necessary since evidence on the one side outweighs evidence on the other side. 
 e) The elimination of an essential contradiction concerning the same fact is 
a tactical mistake as its being insoluble is the evidence itself.  
 f) The elimination of an essential contradiction concerning the same fact is 
necessary but it can be eliminated by some simpler and more certain method 
than confrontation. 
                                                      
effective act. His findings still apply today. In more detail see: Tóth, M.: A szembesítés 
béklyójában [In the shackles of confrontation]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 39 (1984) 139. 
and Feloldható-e a béklyó? [Can shackles be unfastened?] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 39 
(1984) 282. 
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 g) The contradiction to be eliminated could only be eliminated by confron-
tation but no success can be expected from the confrontation.”3 
 There even seems to be some contradiction and uncertainty in the wording of 
the act as if there is a contradiction, a confrontation should be performed, however, 
there is an immediate concession stating that all this shall apply only ‘if necessary’. 
 Some further questions arise: What does ‘if necessary’ mean? Who defines 
what necessity is?  
 The latter can more easily be answered promptly, it is the master of the 
case, ‘dominus litis’, the prosecuter in charge of the investigation, however, he 
is rarely in a position close enough, in other words decision-making is vested 
in the law enforcement official of the police. In the course of a review by the 
prosecution, the prosecutor will order the ‘necessary’ confrontation if the feeling 
of lack arises. If the member of the investigating authority deliberately omitted 
confrontation, a conflict situation arises, as the police officer met the persons 
testifying in the course of the procedure and for some psychological or rational 
reason he deemed confrontation to be unnecessary, inappropriate, undesirable 
or even detrimental to the whole evidentiary procedure and to its final outcome. 
The prosecutor implementing the review has not seen anyone, has not perceived 
any sign of metacommunication or any real personality, only the wording of 
CPA is imperative to him. The conflict can only be resolved on a professional 
basis, namely the investigator should inform the prosecutor about the professional 
reasons and conciliation should be conducted if needed. According to my 
experience of practice, unfortunately, we can never reach the situation in 
which the decision on performing a confrontation could be made solely by the 
investigators operating at the level of the executive since then it might soon 
turn out that there is no need for any confrontations or at least only a few 
would be performed. Investigators would immediately move in the line of least 
resistance since they do not have a high opinion of this institution at present–as 
has been shown by empirical research. They would try to omit confrontation 
due to its circumstantiality (it is always difficult to ensure the presence of more 
than one person at the same time), formality and the lack of faith, and would 
try to save time and energy, which might quickly lead to the decline and death 
of the institution. One counterargument is that an investigator is always 
interested in finding the truth, and is always urged on with what is referred to 
by the term ‘houndspirit’ in American literature, and deploys all lawful means 
including confrontation as a possibility. The idea is quite likeable and works in 
especially important cases, nevertheless, in most of the cases there is no trace 
of such a spirit and it cannot be perceived according to the rule of big numbers. 
  
 3 Tóth, M.: A szembesítés béklyójában, op. cit. 140. 
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 The discretion of a well established decision is respected by the guiding 
decision of the Supreme Court declaring, “if in a criminal case initiated for 
kidnapping the confrontation between the accused and the victim was not 
performed in the course of the investigation due to the sense of fear of the 
victim–and at the time of the trial the victim’s presence could not be ensured 
due to his or her staying at an unknown place–it cannot be regarded as a 
procedural infringement affecting the well-groundedness of the judgement, for 
the very reason that besides the victim’s testimony, the court considered and 
assessed all other evidences and evidentiary tools supporting it.”4 
 In the trial stage it is undoubtedly the independent judge (court) that orders 
a confrontation. Compared to the investigator, the judge is in an easy position 
because the contradicting parties concerned are present, ‘ready at hand’ in the 
courtroom thus the act can be performed quite easily in some moments without 
any special formal or written requirements. 
 Revisiting the first question, the ‘necessary’ cases may be interpreted 
from a positive (permissive) and negative (excluding) aspect. Some important 
permissive conditions are: 
 –  there are essential contradictions between the testimonies;  
 –  the act of the confrontation is likely to be successful, a result can 
reasonably be expected. 
 In my view, the necessity of a confrontation is excluded if: 
 –  a child should be confronted with an adult;  
 –  there is no real chance for the confrontation to be successful, it is reasonably 
assusmed that it will lead to no result and there are data supporting this;  
 –  the protection of the witness or the suspect (e.g. a pentito) requires it (as 
specified in Section 124 (2) of CPA) 
 –  in the interest of the investigation (its success); 
 –  the suspect makes a (even advance) statement refusing to testify in 
confrontation. 
 Further reasons may be found in both categories but these are the most 
frequent ones both in practice and at a theoretical level about which a decision 
must be made by the investigator, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation 
in the first main stage of the criminal proceedings, and the judge (court) in the 
trial stage. 
 It may be clear from my enumeration that I cannot agree with the concession 
prescribed in Section 124 (3) of CPA, pursuant to which a child may also be 
confronted “provided it arouses no fear in the minor”. Having regard to my 
studies, experiences, and the psychological factors, I claim it as a principle fact 
  
 4 Court Decisions 1999/12, case no. 544. (Supreme Court Bf. III. 1284/1998.)  
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that confrontation arouses fear and tension in a child under 14. The wording of 
the act questions the psychological principle of confrontation since the core of 
the act of confrontation is the intensified creation of distress and tension. This 
applies to the atmosphere and the circumstances of its performance even if it is 
not the child that is regarded as the person making untrue statements. It is 
impossible for a child to be in peace and quiet in a situation involving the 
police-authorities, where even adults would be ‘shaky on their legs’ even if 
they have got nothing to do with the crime. This section is welcome to have 
been included in the effective CPA, but it may be regarded as a first step only 
and not as ideal. I would consider it ideal and propose it as de lege ferenda to 
expressly exclude the possibility of confronting a child in the act itself. In my 
opinion subsection (3) should read: (3) A person not having attained the age of 
fourteen shall not be confronted.  
 In this area my opinion dissents from the standpoint of Hungarian courts, 
which is in line with the act in force, and which considers the statutory 
(personal) guarantees sufficient for the protection of children as witnesses in 
the case of confrontation too. According to a guiding decision published in the 
Court Decisions: “In the course of interrogating children not having attained 
the age of 14 as witnesses, the investigating judge shall observe the special rules 
set forth in the act on procedure. These include that such witnesses need not be 
warned concerning the consequences of perjury, they may be confronted only 
if it does not arouse fear in them, and their caretaker or legal representative 
may be present during the act–and cannot be sent out either–even if later they 
might be interrogated as witnesses.” 
 The reasoning contains that several provisions of CPA (the presence of a 
caretaker, a legal representative or perhaps an expert psychologist and 
interrogation by a closed-circuit telecommunication network) establish the 
possibility of mitigating the psychological and other harmful effects inherent 
in the interrogation of a child as a witness to the smallest extent possible and 
necessary thus preventing the possible damages caused to their personality 
development.5 
 My argumentation is supported by the relevant legal practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights, according to which the state of being free 
from fear cannot be ensured at a trial. It should be added that in an investi-
gatory situation the negative effects would be magnified because client-
publicity is limited, the room is much smaller, mysteriousness, etc.  
 The ECHR declared in its guiding decision that the British authorities 
violated the right to a fair hearing guaranteed in Article 6 § 1 when in the case of 
  
 5 Bírósági Határozatok (Court Decisions), 53 (2005) 738, case No. 343. 
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an 11-year-old accused the trial took place over three weeks in public in the 
Crown Court. In its reasoning the Court noted, “the formality and ritual of the 
Crown Court must at times have seemed incomprehensible and intimidating for 
a child of eleven, and there is evidence that certain modifications to the court-
room, in particular the raised dock which was designed to enable the defendants 
to see what was going on, had the effect of increasing the applicant’s sense of 
discomfort during the trial, since they felt exposed to the scrutiny of the press 
and public. Both applicants suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, and had 
limited ability to instruct their lawyers and consult adequately the details of 
their acts. They found the trial depressing and frightening and were unable to 
follow it. In such circumstances the Court did not consider that it was sufficient 
for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 that the applicants were represented by skilled 
and experienced lawyers. Here, although the applicants’ legal representatives 
were seated “within whispering distance”, it was highly unlikely that the 
applicants would have felt sufficiently uninhibited, in the tense courtroom and 
under public scrutiny, to have consulted with them during the trial or, indeed, 
that, given their immaturity and their disturbed emotional state, they would 
have been capable outside the courtroom of cooperating with their lawyers and 
giving them information for the purposes of their defence. In conclusion, the 
Court considered that the applicants were denied a fair hearing in breach of 
Article 6 § 1.”6 
 Concerning necessity, the following question may be asked, is there a 
compulsory confrontation? 
 Is there a situation where the confrontation must be performed in any 
case? 
 The legal answer may be deduced from the act: no. The wording of the act 
contains two restrictions, necessity and possibility. In other words, it no longer 
uses the command ‘shall’ as it used to. I fully agree with it, all the more so as 
besides the legal arguments, there are the criminal-tactical arguments serving 
as confirmation which may occasionally be weightier, more marked and more 
powerful than the legal ones are. The criminal-tactical success cannot be 
sacrificed to the rigidity of the law, in other words the ammunition the 
investigating authorities have cannot be exhausted, jeopardized, weakened or 
‘bungled’ due to the rigid interpretation and application of confrontation. In several 
cases it must be saved for the trial stage even if in the course of discovery the 
  
 6 Eur. Court H. R., Cases T. v. the United Kingdom, and V. v. the United Kingdom 
judgments of 16 December 1999. Available in Hungarian: Bírósági Határozatok, 49 
(2001) 497, case No. 314. 
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‘weapon’ has become known for those against whom the documents contain 
incriminating data.  
 In the course of elaborating on the issue of ‘necessity’, the question of who-
with whom has already been touched upon,7 in other words who is confronta-
tion carried out between, who are the persons who can participate in a 
confrontation as persons to be confronted? 
 The (three) possible options can be inferred from the text of the act: 
 a) suspect-with suspect; 
 b) witness-with witness (including the victim-witness); 
 c) suspect-with (victim)witness. 
 Groups a) and b) are homogeneous in respect of form, in the case of group 
c) confrontation is heterogeneous, since the procedural statuses indicate similarity 
and difference. In the case of the latter, the order of warnings is different as 
well. 
 Heterogeneous confrontation is the most frequent in real life, in which the 
suspect sits face to face with the winess, quite often the victim-witness. In 
most of the reported Hungarian crime cases the known suspect is there alone as 
opposed to an average of five witnesses in a Hungarian criminal case, not all of 
whom are obviously capable of contradicting the suspect in important matters.  
 The findings of my empirical survey also show the actual investigatory 
ratios, out of 541 confrontations: 
 a) suspect-witness 247 instances (46%), 
 b) suspect-victim 122 instances (23%); 
 c) suspect-suspect 88 instances (16%); 
 d) victim-witness 18 instances (3%); 
 e) witness-witness 66 instances (12%;) 
 f) victim-victim 0 instance (0%). 
 Altogether 541 confrontations were carried out in the 186 criminal cases, 
which means 3 (2.9) confrontations on average. It can also be seen that due to 
the average number of witnesses there are more (twice as many) confrontations 
performed between the suspect (and as it is true in the trial stage too, the word 
accused can also be used) and the witness than between the suspect and the 
victim. Altogether the two categories (witness/victim facing the suspect), the 
heterogeneous group makes up nearly 70% (69) of the confrontations. Only 
every sixth is carried out within the homogeneous group of suspects (16%) and 
within the homogeneous group of witnesses (the victim) (altogether 15%). 
  
 7 The question of how is not dealt with here, since the answer is given by criminal-
tactics, and it needs a separate study. 
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 It should be noted here that besides the homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
the participants, Flórián Tremmel differentiates content homo- and hetero-
geneity depending on whether “the source of the contradiction is a mistake on 
both sides or a lie on both sides, or these contradictions were created on the 
one side by a mistake and on the other side by a lie.”8 
 
 
3. Types of confrontation 
 
Besides the dichotomy between homogeneity and heterogeneity, confrontations 
can be classified into different groups. The following classification may also 
be applied: 
A) active (narrow)–passive (wide) (within them personal and material); 
 B) formal–informal; 
 C) replaceable–irreplaceable; 
 D) ex officio–upon request. 
 
 Ad A) So far I have dealt with the legal aspects of confrontation taken in 
the narrow sense, the detailed rules of which are laid down by criminalistics, in 
particular criminal-tactics. This term has another, wider epistemological inter-
pretation as well; as I mentioned in the course of demarcating it from other 
investigatory-evidentiary acts, interrogations, crime-scene interrogations, identifi-
cation parades, attempts to prove, crime scene investigation, search and body 
search, the use of polygraph and hearing experts all have elements of 
confrontation. Unlike personal confrontation which is active, it may be called 
‘passive’, since the person concerned, usually the suspect, sees the scene, the 
proving objects and events in front of him (material confrontation). He or she 
is looking at them passively, though not without being touched and impressed 
as they (may) induce inner tension and further deliberation in the person 
looking. Sometimes the passive looking and facing induces the confession of 
the truth, the modification of a testimony and testifying or confessing itself. 
 A classic literary example of passive confrontation can be read in the short 
story entitled Brutes written by Zsigmond Móricz.9  
 The examining judge felt (knew) that the red faced shepherd and his mate 
had killed Curly the Shepherd and his son but failed to make the shepherd admit 
to it. However, when on his way out of the room the shepherd approached the 
  
 8 Tremmel–Fenyvesi–Herke: Kriminalisztika tankönyv és atlasz, op. cit. 386. 
 9 Móricz, Zs.: Brutes (Translated by Gulyás, Gy.). In: 44 hungarian short stories. 
Budapest, 1979, 68–86. 
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door, and reached his hand for the doorknob, he staggered back. He could not 
touch the doorknob. “He could not move. He just stared and stared and a small 
froth appeared around his mouth.” There, hanging on the doorknob, was the 
brass-ornamented leather belt, with which he and his mate had committed the 
brutal crime. 
 The shepherd slowly raised his hand to his head, turned back, and then 
confessed to his crime, “We killed Curly the Shepherd for his three hundred 
sheep and two donkeys.” 
 
 Ad B) The former active and passive confrontations may be referred to as 
formal and informal confrontations. The formal confrontation is described and 
circumscribed by the provisions of CPA, while the informal confrontation is 
described in and by criminal-tactical recommendations. This statement is true 
even if the formal confrontation is claimed to be an institution with a double 
formation. It can be examined both in a legal and in a criminalistic sense and 
rules and recommendations can be found pertaining to it. (It should be added 
that considering its psychological features, it is rather an institution with a 
triple formation.) 
 All acts–occurring in any stage of the criminal proceedings–can be called 
informal10 in the course which confessors are faced in some form with the 
truth, a standpoint, some evidence, a testimony or some data different from 
what they have conveyed. And it applies to all possible participants of the 
confrontation such as thesuspect, the victim and the witness. 
 An example of a confession induced by an informal confrontation can be read 
in the ballad entitled Call to the Ordeal by János Arany11, in which there is an 
informal confrontation with a dead person. 
 A young man was found in the woods with a dirk in his heart. “…he unto 
the ordeal calls / All he suspects, to view the test / Which must the guilt make 
manifest.” First the young man’s enemies are called to the dead body, then his 
friends, relatives and finally his beautiful lover and secret bride. When the girl 
appears, blood begins to flow out of the wound. Then the girl told what had 
happened. She didn’t kill the boy, but she gave him the dirk. The boy urged 
  
 10 Endre Bócz refers to this category by the term ‘tactical’ confrontation. In more 
detail see Bócz, E.: A kihallgatások szervezése [Arranging interrogations]. Belügyi 
Szemle, 11 (1973) 93. 
 11 Arany, J.: Call to the Ordeal (translated by William N. Loew). In: Arany, J.: Toldi; 
Toldi's eve; Ballads; Selected lyrics (translated by William N. Loew). New York, 1914. 
164–166. 
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her to say ‘yes’ or else he would kill himself. Then the girl gave him the dirk 
and replied him to do so. 
 
 “My heart in the truth, he did possess; 
 He should have known it; but, ah, woe! 
He still besought another, ‘Yes,’ 
 ‘Or,’ said he, ‘to my death I’ll go,’ 
 Here, take my dirk, and end it so!” 
 
 Besides objects, persons may also informally have an effect on persons 
lying or deceiving. 
 Kálmán Mikszáth gives a wonderful literary example of it in his novel, The 
Noszty Boy’s Affair with Mari Tóth,12 in which Ferenc Noszty–who had already 
committed a bill fraud–and again wanted to get the girl with a big dowry by 
fraudulent means. 
 
 “You haven’t heard the last of this,” roard Feri and tore himself from the 
hands that were restraining him. “We’ll settle accounts, master-baker! 
We’ll settle accounts…” 
 And, his bloodshot eyes rolling ominously in their sockets, he was 
moving towards Tóth again with raised fists when suddenly the library 
door opened and a tall, handsome soldier stepped into the room and said to 
him sharply: 
“Did you want something?” 
 Ferenc Noszty recoiled at the familiar voice and glanced fearfully in the 
direction from which the question had come. 
 Colonel Stromm was standing on the threshold, his arms folded, and he 
repeated: 
 “What do you want?” 
 Noszty’s arms fell limply down and a deathly pallor came over his face. 
 “I want to go home, Colonel,” he groaned in a pathetic, broken voice. 
 
 Ad C) The pair of replaceable–irreplaceable confrontation is connected to 
what has been claimed about ‘necessity’. The confrontation is necessary to be 
performed if–among others–it cannot be replaced with anything else, if we 
cannot get close to the evidence in any other way, or if there is no other  
 
  
 12 Mikszáth, K.: The Noszty Boy’s Affair with Mari Tóth (Translated by Bernard 
Adams). Budapest. 2005. 414. 
 CONFRONTATION FROM A CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL APPROACH 45 
  
possibility. Consequently, it may be deduced from the train of thought and 
the wording of the act as a general rule that it is not an ‘ultima ratio’, neither 
is it to be deployed in the first place; it may only be applied if it cannot be 
substituted with anything else, and it cannot be applied if the elimination of 
the contradiction would be a tactical mistake. What can replace it? Here we 
can refer to the thoughts above, the classification into active–passive and 
formal–informal. Active and formal confrontation acts may be replaced with 
passive and informal ones. The ‘father’, the original source and the starting 
point of confrontation is interrogation, whose gown confrontation itself has 
slipped out of. Nonetheless, such may be the other special form of interroga-
tion, the crime-scene interrogation or testifying on the spot, further, identifica-
tion parades, and other open and covered data collection and requests. 
However, the danger of delay, ‘periculum in mora’ should be considered; a 
means which is also expedient in time, which serves the double requirement 
of swiftness and thoroughness of criminal proceedings and investigations is 
to be applied.  
 
 Ad D) By prescribing confrontation as a possible method applicable if 
‘necessary’ instead of the former imperative of ‘shall’, which I approve of, 
the legislator has eliminated the obligation stemming from officiality, the 
obligation of carrying out confrontation ex officio. Consequently, even if there 
is a contradiction, it is not sure that there will be a confrontation. This has 
opened up the way in front of the theoretical and practical possibility of a 
petition to perform a confrontation which may come from both the subjects of 
the defense (the suspect, the defense counsel or the legal representative of 
the minor) and the victim or perhaps the non-injured witness. Petition is not 
the right expression, as I usually say, the defense counsel (the defense) is not 
a begger, he or she does not have to beg in the course of the proceedings, let 
alone in connection with evidencing. (The term petition to be released is 
appropriately replaced with the term motion in the act.) The defense can hand 
in a motion to perform a confrontation as part of the defense tactics. The 
victim is also entitled to it but the simple (non-injured) witness–quite 
properly–not. 
 The motion does not have to be agreed to, the confrontation does not have 
to be performed; it is at the discretion of the authorities. In the case of rejection, 
a resolution has to be made to this effect, against which the initiator is entitled 
to seek legal remedy.  
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4. Participatory rights and duties concerning confrontation 
 
4.1.  Presence, activity and asking questions 
 
There at least three persons present at an investigatory confrontation (This is 
the main concern of my analysis), the person conducting the confrontation 
and the two persons being confronted. Beyond this standard, however, other 
persons may be present, the official keeper of minutes, the defense counsel of 
the suspect, the attorney of the (victim)witness, the prosecutor and in the case 
of an illiterate person’s confrontation–upon a motion to this effect–two official 
witnesses at the disclosure of the minutes, since it is a special form of 
interrogation. All these persons have a statutory right to be present, moreover, 
the person conducting the confrontation may allow, if necessary, the presence 
of a (sign)interpreter, an expert, a psychologist, a probation officer, a legal 
representative, a caretaker, a teacher if the person to be confronted is a 
juvenile/child. 
 It should be noted here that the Constitutional Court has touched upon the 
issue of confrontation only once and only indirectly. It declared the unconstitu-
tionality of the situation concerning the application of official witnesses by a 
majority decision. I myself agree with Árpád Erdei, who expressed a concurring 
opinion claiming that “the mere presence of an official witness at the con-
frontation entails his/her gaining an insight even into the most intimate details 
of the person(s), private individual(s) concerned (for example body search and 
house search)”. It should be added that it applies to confrontations too, for 
instance one carried out in connection with a sexual crime (committed within 
the family).  
 Árpád Erdei added, “The effective act on criminal procedure excludes even 
client-publicity in the case of most investigatory acts. Thus it does not allow 
the presence of either the suspect or the defense counsel at the interrogation of 
witnesses whose interrogation has not been requested by them, excludes them 
from the confrontations between the witnesses, and even makes confrontation 
omissible. Taken all this together, it may be suggested that the presence of 
official witnesses is not required either by the efficiency of the investigation or 
by any noticable interest of the authorities. The advantages that used to be 
entailed by the application of official witnesses are now repleceable by other 
methods which better serve the prevalence of objectivity, and do not jeopardise 
the interests of others. The continuously expanding technical possibilities and 
methods which are also referred to by the act are suitable for eliminating 
all the disorders and abuses which the application of official witnesses 
automatically entail even in the case of a guarantee system satisfying higher 
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level requirements than those at present. It follows, that Section 183 of CPA, 
allowing for the application of official witnesses, is unconstitutional because it 
unnecessarily and disproportionately restricts the rights laid down in Article 
59. (1) of the Constitution.”13 
 A further issue may be whether only the leading defense counsel or all the 
defense counsels may be present in the case a suspect has more than one defense 
counsel. The act does not govern this issue; in my view only the leading defense 
counsel or an attorney or a legal trainee substituting him or her may be present. 
The size of rooms available for confrontations, the tactics of confrontation and 
the psychological requirement according to which the number of the ‘adversary’ 
should not be too large, it should not weigh on or be a psychological burden 
and pressure on the victim, on the witness or in rare cases on the other suspect. 
 The same ‘self-restraint’ is to be voluntarily imposed on the investigating 
authority, since it may seem to be too much of pressure and forced interrogation if 
several persons queued up behind the investigator keeping the minutes as if 
showing off strength, which might induce fear and intimidate any of the persons 
to be confronted. 
 In the case of a witness-witness confrontation, the question arises as to 
whether the defense counsel of the suspect may be present or not. Under the 
general rule of the effective Hungarian regulation, the defense counsel may only 
be present at the interrogation of his own witnesses. Considering that confron-
tation is a combined form of interrogation, this rule is applicable and has to be 
extended to cover it: the defense counsel may be present at a confrontation (the 
authority has the duty of notice) where one of the participants is a witness whose 
interrogation has been requested by the defense counsel. A counterargument 
may be that in this way the defense counsel might have access to the contents 
of the testimony of the other side’s witnesses whose interrogation he was not 
present at and the minutes of which he has no copy of. The authorities have 
two ways to eliminate this concern: they either omit the confrontation for a 
tactical reason in the interest of the success of the investigation or postpone the 
confrontation until right before discovery when there is not too much left to 
hide from the defense. 
 The presence of both the witness–provided he or she cannot refuse to 
testify, there is no obstacle to it, or he is not exempt–and the suspect may be 
enforced. A witness may be brought in if he fails to attend and may be fined 
for not testifying. If the witness still does not open up, it brings about the 
criminal law threat of perjury, though only at a theoretical level. Certainly, a 
  
 13 Decision No. 43/2004 (17. 11) AB of the Constitutional Court and the concurring 
opinion attached to it. 
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kind of a block which the authority has to remove by criminal-tactical means 
has occurred or the confrontation has to be cancelled due to fear, intimidation, 
psychological block, etc. which the witness himself may indicate. There is no 
point in increasing tension to the breaking point and stubbornly insisting on the 
confrontation of a witness who is blocked, since in such a situation no positive 
result can be expected. To the contrary, the witness may be expected to become 
more reserved and frightened, which does not do any good to the whole case or 
procedure. 
 The suspect can also be forced to attend the venue of the confrontation, he 
or she has to appear once summonsed, however, it is pointless if the suspect, 
fully aware of all legal warnings, stated in advance that he would not make a 
confession at the confrontation. Forcing a confession would violate the Miranda 
principle, further, in my view forcing the suspect to make a confession against 
his own will and intention arouses the suspicion of a forced interrogation. 
Once it has been stated that confrontation is a special, combined interrogation, 
the rules of interrogation obviously apply to it as well, according to which in 
case of refusal, even putting questions is forbidden. A confrontation is, however, 
started by asking a question and is continued by doing so again. 
 It may occur, and I have conducted some empirical research into this, that 
the suspect might be present, he may not have been able to avoid it, nonethe-
less, he does not look into the other’s eyes or horribile dictu even lowers his 
head, closes his eyes or reads his notes, in other words shows total passivity 
(frivolousness) or resistance. There is no efficient means for preventing it, the 
person conducting the confrontation can do only one thing. The confrontation 
must immediately be terminated, as no success can be expected due to the lack 
of the psychological basis, further, this can stop the suspect from further ‘taking 
the air’ and possibly obtaining information from the other party. 
 The situation in the courtroom is totally different. One of the persons to be 
confronted is already there, (just like the defense counsel, the attorney of the 
witness, the legal representative of the victim, the experts, etc.) he will hear the 
other contradicting suspects and witnesses, thus, following the passive (informal) 
confrontation, there can be no power of surprise, the formal confrontation can 
have no real strength. Besides, –as I have already mentioned–by the end of the 
investigation he has got to know or may have got to know the standpoints of 
persons making contradicting testimonies, which also weakens the chances of 
a successful confrontation. 
 According to the wording of the act, the persons being confronted may ask 
each other questions but this seems to be possible only after the authority has 
put its questions. This is in conflict with criminal-tactical requirements, since 
real confrontation develops through an argument which, of course, must be 
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channelled appropriately. I regard it redundant and unnecessary to grant the 
right to ask questions in a statute, as the content-requirements of confrontation 
are defined by criminal-tactics (and the person performing it) but these detailed 
rules must not be listed in the framework of criminal procedure law. 
 In my view, as it is a special form of interrogation, the defense counsel, the 
attorney of the witness, and the legal representative of the victim may ask 
questions but only once the questions between the authority and the persons 
being confronted have been asked and recorded. The answer to a question 
asked by a ‘quasi investigator’ must be given by looking into each other’s eyes 
and not to the person asking the question.  
 
4.2. Taking the minutes and its copy 
 
Under the effective CPA minutes must be taken of the confrontation, while 
formerly a report could be drafted in misdemeanour procedures. It should be 
noted here that in my opinion minutes should only be taken if the formal 
confrontation has some result, namely one or both of the persons confronted 
have changed their testimonies. My argumentation is supported by the 
following: 
 – It would make the procedure simpler and quicker if the investigator could 
record unsuccessful confrontations in reports. Usually no minutes are taken of 
negative (unsuccessful) investigatory acts and data collections, for instance of 
the fact that a person interrogated near the scene does not know about the case 
or knows only about irrelevant facts.  
 – Only successful confrontations providing a result or a change deserve 
attention in the course of the rest of the procedure, but then taking the minutes 
is important due to the Miranda warnings and the evidentiary force of the 
testimony. 
 – In the trial stage it is also recorded in one practical sentence only, “the 
confrontation has yielded no result”. 
 – My main argument is that during the preliminary proceeding the investigator 
performing the confrontation could focus on the core of confrontation: the 
atmosphere, inducing tension, genuine clashing, sharpening the actual counter-
front-statement, the personality of the persons being confronted, bridging the 
gap between them, observing the person (presumably) making an untrue 
testimony, the tactics of confrontation based on criminal-psychology, and 
moves in the direction of the result. 
 – Taking the minutes/dictating, mainly in the case of persons not very good 
(but also who are good) at typing/dictating engages attention and consumes 
energy, makes the person conducting the confrontation unfocussed, disorganised 
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and scatterbrained and by giving substantial time for preparation, provides an 
escape pursuit for the liar who perceives that the person conducting the con-
frontation is uncertain and unfocussed. In this atmosphere, in the obscurity of 
typing, the other person telling the truth also weakens and fades away gradually, 
then eye-contact disappears, as ‘there is nobody to shepherd the flock’. 
 I fully approve of the fact that the two-coloumn composition of recording 
advised in books on criminal-tactics and used from the 1960s to the 1980s has 
disappeared from practice. On the one hand, the computer softwares and forms 
used by the police do not apply this form. (I can only hope that partly because 
the editors came to the same conclusion as my aforementioned argumentation 
proposing simplification.) On the other hand, even law enforcers realised that 
it made taking the minutes of the confrontation even more complicated, more 
tiring, and slower. The two-coloumn composition of recording has never made 
any sense, neither has verbose and babbling minutes.  
 Confrontations may also be recorded technically, following the tape-
recoding14 which has been used for decades, now (even digital) videorecording 
can also be applied. All the more so as this can record images not only voices. 
The whole procedure becomes visible for us afterwards, which may especially 
be valuable if either of the persons confronted has made a change concerning 
an essential, relevant, and material fact. It may strengthen the authenticity and 
the evidentiary force of the confession and it is true for the trial stage and for 
the scope of discretion applied there too. The recording can certify the fairness 
of the procedure, and can prevent a result achieved there going into the group 
of excluded evidence. 
 A debated question is whether to record the official remarks about the 
perceived communication and metacommunication signs in the minutes together 
with any reference to the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of the confron-
tation at the end of the minutes.  
 With regard to the first question, the findings of my research into the 
psychological basic features show that no certain conclusions concerning truth 
coverage or lying can be drawn from non-verbal signs (sweating, crossing legs, 
scratching, etc.). Consequently, their recording is also unnecessary, neither are 
they good for guidance, they may even influence and mislead subsequent readers 
of the minutes. Thus, also prosecutors and judges. It is one-sided because either 
the defense counsel, the suspect, or any of the persons confronted might 
request their inclusion into the minutes. The suspect may claim the same with 
  
 14 A detailed study on the then modern taperecording: Bócz, E.: Szembesítés mag-
netofon alkalmazásával a nyomozás során [Confrontation and the use of a taperecorder 
in the course of investigation]. Ügyészségi Értesítő, 2 (1965) No. 4. 
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good reason; once the authority records such things about him, why could not 
his observations be also recorded. Under such circumstances I am rather happy 
than discontented with the small number of the records of metacommunicative 
signs I found in the course of my empirical research. 
 I regard the recording of successfulness/unsuccessfulness–contrary to the 
recommendations of many investigating instructions–absolutely unnecessary and 
pointless. It should be enough to simply report an unsuccessful confrontation–
as it has already been stated. However, due to the obligation to take minutes, 
as it is a special form of interrogation (especially if one of the participants is 
the suspect, since then taking the minutes is obligatory anyway), the outcome 
is obvious from the content. On the other hand, if there is a positive result, the 
consecutive (one-person) interrogation of the person making a change is desirable 
as may be the taking of the minutes of the crime scene interrogation. This will 
clearly show that the confrontation has been successful. If no interrigation 
follows, it may not be appropriate from the point of view of criminal-tactics to 
‘blab it out’ to him in writing that there has been a sort of shift or change, the 
authority has obtained some new infromation during the confrontation. In such 
a case there is no need for calling attention to it by declaring it. I have not been 
able to find one single argument in favour of it, only arguments against it. The 
question must be asked as to why the authority deemed it necessary to put that 
sentence at the end. 
 Defense may get a copy of it for free (since April 2006), after–upon the 
initiative of among others, this author15–the Constitutional Court has adopted 
its decision, concerning this issue, complying with European standards and the 
requirement of due process including the equality of arms.  
 ccording to the general rule, the copy is not for free in the case of a victim-
witness; however, if the official of the authority allows–and he can do so if it 
does not harm the interest of the investigation–a copy to be issued to him, the 
witness has to pay for it, actually HUF 100 per page.  
 I agree with the provisions pertaining to copies, I do not consider their 
amendment necessary or desirable.  
 
4.3. Legal remedy 
 
As each coin has two sides, a complaint may be lodged by the defense (the 
suspect or the defense counsel). On the one hand because of performing a 
  
 15 Csorbul-e a védelem alkotmányos elve az iratmásolás illetékeztetésével? [Is the 
constitutional principle of defense victim by imposing a duty on copying documents?] 
Belügyi Szemle, 47 (1999) 45. 
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confrontation, on the other hand because of omitting it. If the suspect states it 
in advance on record (or in a self-testimony) that he does not intend to take 
part in a confrontation and he does not intend to make a testimony in the course 
of it, there is an obstacle to the confrontation. Even forcing him to attend against 
his own will is not useful. Even subsequent to the CPA coming into effect, i.e. 
even in 2003 (unfortunately quite frequently before it), the authorities conducted 
‘one-party’ confrontations where the suspect refused to make a testimony, and 
exercised his right to silence, nevertheless a ‘one-sided’ confrontation was 
carried out. Mainly due to being afraid of the prosecutor sending the case back 
for ‘supplementation’. Fortunately, this practice, resembling forced interrogation, 
and going against the Miranda-principle, which was unfortunate even for 
criminal-tactical reasons (e.g. the suspect could obtain data and information), 
was abandoned in a few months as the result of the position of prosecution 
applying the appropriate interpretation.  
 The defense counsel of the suspect sometimes ‘objected to’ performing a 
confrontation in advance, prior to the confrontation. I might say, he submitted 
a motion for not conducting the confrontation. However, such a form does not 
exist; defense may only note that according to its position the confrontation is 
not desireable or even unlawful for some reason. Thus, there is no advance 
legal remedy in the case of confrontation either, it can only be simultaneous 
with the implementation of the act or subsequent to it. 
 Concerning this issue, there is a guiding court decision illuminating for the 
defense too, in which a defense counsel was found guilty of defamation. The 
counsel made the following statement before the confrontation of his client, “I 
am objecting to the hearing of this woman and to her confrontation with my 
client because she is the person who reported to the police and she is banned 
from the territory of the district anyway.” The court held that only the 
statements of defense made in the framework required for deciding the case are 
privileged and this statement was not in this category. Confrontation is a means 
of evidencing the performance of which does not depend on the previous 
record of the parties, neither on their possible objectionable conduct.16 
 If defense submits a motion for the performance of a confrontation, the 
authority must handle it in line with the rules of evidentiary motions. It must 
either be approved of and then performed, or not approved of and rejected by a 
resolution in writing against which a complaint may be lodged which will be 
decided on by the prosecutor in charge of the investigation (or the super-
ordinate prosecutor).  
  
 16 Court Decisions 1989, case no. 6. (Municipal Court of Budapest, 20. Bf. 1. 
5766/1988.) 
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 Defense may complain about the fact of the investigatory confrontation and 
the way of its performance too. The complaint, however, has no delaying 
effect, thus the authority first performs the confrontation and only later decides 
about the legal remedy. A complaint may be directed against the conduct of 
the investigator and against the actual implementation too, alleging that it was 
biased, humiliating, suggestive, leading, treating the person concerned as 
guilty, degrading, violent, rough, etc. 
 Confrontation is ordered in the form of an order guiding the proceedings 
aginst which no legal remedy is available. The defense, the attorney of the 
witness, or the legal representative of the victim may also note here that there 




5. The probative force of confrontation, excluded evidence  
 
The purpose of the whole criminal procedure including the investigation is to 
hold a proper mirror, ascertain the real (true) facts of a necessarily past act, a 
process of acquiring knowledge, in the course of which it can be decided 
whether a crime has been committed (can be prosecuted), who the offender is, and 
whether he is punishable.17 In the course of investigation, the facts establishing 
criminal responsibility are to be collected, relevant evidences are to be detected 
and collected on the basis of which the prosecutor can decide whether there is 
enough evidence for arraignment, for committal for trial or not. 
 According to László Pusztai László, “Cognition is a progression from not-
knowing to knowing, from defective and imperfect knowledge to ever enriching 
and more and more thorough knowledge”.18 Regarding the fact that the act to 
detect is a past and usually a concealed, a hidden, and a covered act, it is often 
a difficult–even–painful process to grasp reality through senses and experience, 
and to detect evidence related to reality at the beginning and in the course of 
the whole process. This process may be facilitated by the mental-assessing 
activity of the authority trying to infer a past cycle of events from the present. 
In this framework it sets up hypotheses and versions. It deems something true 
and tries to confirm or refute it subsequently by evidence collected in the 
course of investigation. Confrontation as an act of investigation-evidencing in 
  
 17 For more details see: Barna, P.: A bűnüldözés elvi kérdései [Theoretical issues of 
criminal investigation]. Budapest, 1971. 376. 
 18 Pusztai, L.: Szemle a büntetőeljárásban [Review in criminal procedure]. Budapest, 
1977. 422. 
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which the authority has some sort of version or conjecture if not a pre-
conception fits into this train of thought. As the authority often has a bunch of 
evidence, however modest, and a hypothesis, upon noticing the contradictions 
between the testimonies, it starts out from the presumption that somebody 
has told the truth while the other person has told something untrue (a lie). 
Confrontation is meant to move this uncertainty into a direction, since if every-
thing was certain, clear and unambiguous, the procedure of confrontation would 
become unnecessary and a kind of over-evidencing. The purpose is to move 
from uncertainty towards certainty; it is an attempt to check existing versions 
and conjectures. Certainty may mean the exclusion of a version, and it may 
also be valuable, because it may show that the route is wrong, investigation 
might reach a deadlock, there is no point in taking that route so it must be 
quitted. A positive attempt confirming a version is not a complete success, 
taking the possibility that a confrontation may induce a suspect who has denied 
up to that point to change or perhaps make a confession which may not be real, 
full, and precise.  
 
Is a testimony evidence, what force does it have? 
 
According to one content-pillar of the warnings based on the Miranda-principle–
which the suspect to be confronted will get to know –, “anything you say can 
be used as evidence”. On this ground all his words and sentences uttered 
during the confrontation can be used as evidence. This thought is strengthened 
by our definition, according to which confrontation is a special form of inter-
rogation and the minutes of the confrontation as the testimony of the suspect 
is included in the evidences. However, at the same time this weakens the 
argumentation, i.e. its independent existence as evidence. It is rather of a 
supplementary and subsidiary nature, according to Flórián Tremmel19 the 
‘amplified/supplement-evidence’ nature of the testimony made during con-
frontation is shown. It will become really valuable if following the ‘test of trust-
worthiness’, the probative force of the words and the testimony is strengthened 
and made unambiguous in the framework of an individual interrogation or a 
crime scene interrogation (on-the-spot interrogation). In the quoted case of the 
suspect, he makes a detailed confession, a confession with a ‘perpetrator’s 
mind’, which can be checked.  
 In the case of confrontations assessed to be successful, the party being 
confronted sometimes simply says, “so it happened”, which indicates a wish to 
  
 19 See: Tremmel, F.: Bizonyítékok a büntetőeljárásban [Evidences in criminal procedure]. 
Budapest–Pécs, 2006. 178. 
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get released from the situation of the confrontation rather than self-incrimi-
nation based on a genuine intent to change or confess which can be regarded as 
evidence. 
 I do not deny the right of the authority in the final instance that of the court 
to have discretion in regarding what has been uttered during confrontation as 
evidence but I deem it appropriate only with the above restrictions and 
additions. 
 Finally, when evaluating evidence, it must also be examined whether it has 
been obtained lawfully in compliance with the requirements of a constitutional 
state founded on the rule of law and (European) human rights. The forms of 
negative conduct on the side of investigating-authority mentioned in the 
section on legal remedy may reach a level at which the possible result cannot 
be admissible, cannot be included among the lawfully obtained evidences and 
must be excluded. Such can be evidence obtained in a manner contravening the 
provisions of CPA, in other words, evidence obtained unlawfully, including–
but not limited to–the following cases: 
 – the person conducting the confrontation uses violence against either of 
the parties being confronted; 
 – the person conducting the confrontation threatens either of the parties 
being confronted;  
 – the person conducting the confrontation fails to give the warnings 
(concerning the rights and duties) appropriate to the status of the parties to be 
confronted; 
 – the official conducting the confrontation records falsities in the minutes 
and/or falsify the contents of the minutes; 
 – the official violates the rules of criminal-tactics to such an extent which 
injures the fairness of the investigating act (e.g. sits/stands more than one 
person facing the other, continuously puts pressure on the persons being 
confronted, puts leading-influencing-suggesting and/or deceiving questions 
with an untrue basis).  
 Infringements of the law concerning confrontation may occur during the 
trial stage too, the consequence of which is necessarily a procedural non-
compliance. 
 The court has declared such non-compliances in its guiding decision when 
satating: 
 “An unconditional procedural non-complience occurs when the court of 
first instance conducts a trial and takes evidence in the absence of the suspect, 
contrary to the statutory provision prescribing the presence of the suspect.”  
 The accused of the first order failed to appear at the trial of the first 
instance on 21st of March 2003, though duly summonsed. In spite of it, the 
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court examined K. Gy. as a witness, who gave evidence concerning the act 
committed jointly by the accused of the second and third order, thus the court 
conducted evidencing. According to the record, the necessity of the confronta-
tion was replaced by allowing K. Gy. to give evidence in writing. This act of 
evidence was not repeated in the presence of the accused of the second order 
during a subsequent procedure.20  
 It declared in another case: “During the interrogation of a child or a juvenile, 
the presence of his caretaker and teacher is not compulsory; it is a procedural 
non-compliance if the court excludes the testimonies of such witnesses made 
in the course of the investigation from the evidences.” 
 The court of first instance excluded the testimonies made by J. B., juvenile 
and G. B., child in the course of the investigation, and also excluded the 
confrontations. The court based its decision on the fact that these witnesses were 




6.  Summary 
 
In conclusion to the study it may be claimed that the concept and the types 
(classification) of confrontation is clear. As an evidentiary procedure, it can 
be well demarcated and distinguished from other applicable means of seeking 
the truth in CPA and beyond it in the area of criminal-tactics. Thus, from 
interrogation, identification parade, attempt to prove, crime scene interroga-
tion, search/body search, parallel hearing of experts, polygraph and cross-
examination. 
 Contrary to jurisprudence and the intention of the legislator, the emphasis 
of confrontation is still on the investigatory and not on the trial statge, which I 
myself support mainly on the basis of criminal-tactical arguments. 
I propose the amendment of the statutory regulation in force to the effect that 
the application of confrontation should be excluded in the case of children, 
  
 20 Court Decisions 2005, case no. 100. (Legf. Bír. Bfv. [Supreme Court criminal 
appeal cases] III. 613/2004.) This interpretation coincides with Court Decisions BH 
1987. case no. 187. “Evidence taken by a court of first instance during a trial in the absence 
of the accused does not constitute an unconditional annulment, provided evidencing is 
repeated subsequently in the presence of the accused.” (Eln. Tan. B. törv. [Supreme 
Court Presidential Department criminal cases] 1426/1986.) 
 21 Court Decisions 1996, case no. 520. (Supreme Court, Legf. Bír. Bf. 1. 245/0996.) 
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further, the persons conducting confrontation should be provided with the 
possibility to record in a report–instead of the minutes.  
 Finally, I claim that there is no such a thing as a compulsory confrontation 
and there are methods of confrontation which lead to the exclusion of 
evidence.  
 In my view–based on research optimism–the consideration and application 
of these ideas in legislation and law enforcement may result in a higher level 
of efficiency and success, which is in the interest of all law-abiding citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
